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Abstract—Distributed Denial of Service attacks (DDoS) are a
major threat to the Internet and detecting this kind of attacks
as far as possible from the victim and close as possible to
its source is a real challenge. We propose a new framework
named FireCollaborator to deal with this problem on the Internet
Service Provider (ISP) level, based on collaborating Intrusion
Prevention Systems (IPS). A potential victim asks and pays the
ISP to be protected. The key point is to use compressed metrics
(i.e., frequency and entropy) based on the routing rules in order
to extract suspected flows. The information and alerts are shared
amongst the IPSs to enhance their believes about the network
status and thus to counter the attacks far away from the victim
and to save the network resources.1
I. I NTRODUCTION
Maintaining a secure network has become a necessity for
the survival of many entities that depend on their Internet
presence. Protection against network attacks is a must to stay
competitive in today’s global market. Thus, denial of service
attacks (DoS) have been considered one of the main threats
against computer networks. Normally, a huge set of machines
(zombies) are used to launch a distributed denial of service
(DDoS) attack [1] against a certain server or set of servers.The
attack, originating from different sources, is very hard toetect
via any single border firewall or IDS as each device has only a
local view. Besides, attackers try to generate packets thatlook
like normal traffic. On the other hand, protecting the server
at the close vicinity of its network is also inefficient because
it becomes overwhelming for a single device to perform all
the packets classification of the huge concentrated amount of
traffic that it receives. The proposed system (FireCollabortor)
is a distributed detection and alert/information sharing system
that allows several Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPSs) to
collaborate in order to stop distributed attacks as far as pos ible
from the victim. Contrary to common solutions which are
deployed in the lowest level in the network, an ISP level
solution should save a lot of resources because the attackers’
locations can be determined with high precision. Thereforethe
countermeasures can be defined to suit well these locations and
can be placed at the most effective points of the network. We
propose using the system in Tier 3 networks where the clients
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that ask for protection will get this optional service from their
direct Internet provider, who will charge them for it. Periodic
subscription requests are used to update the IPSs involved
in the protection structure, and to remove the overhead of
protecting machines/servers that are down/inactive. Thisar-
chitecture based on a payable service is a real motivation for
ISPs that could be reluctant to deploy a distributed defense
mechanism in the core of their networks. For the customer,
it is a real gain because they are not forced to deploy and
configure the security equipments on their own networks. In
the following sections, we describe the subscription protoc l
used by clients in Section II, and an overview of the system
technique in Section III. In Section IV, the main components
of the system will be described. A preliminary evaluation is
presented in Section V before a section about related works
and the conclusion.
II. SUBSCRIPTIONPROTOCOL
The ISP needs to be aware of servers and clients that
subscribe to the protection service it provides. Without a sub-
scription protocol, the ISP will loose the monetary incentive
as well as force his routers to build tables containing all of
his client machines. The main tasks of the protocol; 1) build
up-to-date tables of subscribers at each IPS (i.e., router nodes),
and 2) organize these IPSs intovirtual rings customized for
each client.
Our protocol described in Fig.1 uses a trusted serverS
in the ISP to play the role of the token issuer. When a
client subscribes (as a subnet or a single machine) for the
protection service, the trusted server will add an entry showing
the subscribing IP (or subnet) of the ClientC along with its
subscription period and the client capacity (i.e., the maximum
packet rate the client can handle). Periodically,C requests
a new token fromS. Then,S checks its tables and issue a
token, signed with its private key to the clientC. The token
contains the client ID (i.e., the IP or subnet of the client), the
expiry of the token, and any optional information.C will send
a multi-cast subscription message (SMsg) to all routers in the
ISP asking them to update their tables with his entry (i.e., all
participating routers are members of this multicast group). The
TTL in the periodic request message will be used to identify
the ring number. In this way, routers at the same hop-distance
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Fig. 1. The subscription protocol, showing the different communication steps
needed to build the environment
from C will belong to the same ring (relative to this specific
C). In response to the subscription message (SMsg), routers
will send another set of multi-cast ring messages (RMsg)
identifying themselves as ring members in the form of a
membership phrase (e.g., “IPS 10.12.76.25 belongs to ring
3 of client 10.120.87.*” =<10.12.76.25, 3, 10.120.87.*>).
Also, the IPS can piggyback several membership phrases in
the same RMsg to save bandwidth overhead. IPSs will use the
information in RMsg to know its neighbors in a ring w.r.t. a
specificC, by looking up the closest IPSs with the same ring
level. Also, the IPS chooses the IPS that sent it the SMsg as
the next in the path to the client (for vertical communication,
as will be seen in Section IV).
III. T ECHNIQUE OVERVIEW
The goal is to detect the DDoS attack as far from the victim
as possible. Thus the system aims to detect and counter the
attacks at the Internet Service Provider Level, specifically tier
three. This level is splitted into a number of rings. Intuitively,
as we go closer to the source the traffic gets more concentrated.
Then it is clear that it is easier to detect the attack at a
low level (i.e., at a ring near the victim) but the goal is to
detect such flows as far as possible. Therefore, our approach
uses a detection process that goes from outer to inner rings.
Traditionally, an IPS has only rules (routing rules) but we
assume that the IPS has - for a subscribing client - a rule that
matches packets with the client’s destination address. It ialso
possible that the client wants a defense depending on different
packet properties. Therefore the rule can be defined by a kind
of aggregation of common rules. The frequency of a rule is
used in [2] to optimize the rule ordering of a firewall. Assume
that fi is the number of packets matching the ruleRi, the
frequency of the rule is:
Fi =
fi∑n
i=1 fi
(1)
The general scheme is:
Fig. 2. The different components and the detection process
• An IPS detects an abnormal value using the frequency
and the entropy (details in the next section)
• The IPS cannot conclude directly and sends this informa-
tion to next IPS on the path (vertical communication)
• At a lower level, an IPS receives different information
and can detect that a traffic is suspect. An horizontal
communication is initiated in order to determine the
overall packets rate of this traffic. It is compared with
the theoretic capacity of the destination host.
Generally, after the detection process, a response to counter
the attack need to be provided. However, in this paper, our
main goal is to provide a solution for the detection and this
will be the main focus of the paper.
A. Entropy and relative entropy
The entropy for a set of rules is defined as.
H = −E[logfi] = −
n∑
i=1
f(i)logn(fi)
wherefi is the frequency of the ruleRi
Entropy gives an idea of the traffic distribution. For exam-
ple, if all rule frequencies of an IPS are equal (uniform distri-
bution), the entropy is one. The more skewed the frequencies
are the lower the entropy is. Relative entropy is another metic
which is very useful for detecting changes in the distribution.
We utilize the Kullback-Leibler distance that is defined as:
K(f, f ′) =
n∑
i=1
fi ψi
whereψi = log
fi
f ′
i
, fi is the frequency ofRi in the second
distribution, andf ′i is the frequency ofRi in the first distri-
bution.
If the distributions are equivalent, the entropy is zero. The
more different the distributions are the higher the value is.
From an information theoretic point of view,ψi represents the
drop in the information content of this individual flow.
IV. IPS COMPONENTS
In this section and in the Figure 2, the different functionality
components of each IPS are described.
A. Profile the traffic
Checking each rule for abnormalities can be a tedious task
and will yield inaccurate results. A profile is very useful to
detect abnormal values in rule frequencies. For each rule, the
values of the frequency and the entropy are saved. It is possible
to use multiple profiles: daily, weekly intervals or a simpler
form by taking just the previous values.
B. Selection manager
For scalability and real time constraints, all rules of each
IPS can not be analyzed. So an IPS has to select the rules
to analyze. The selection is based on the attack belief. The
selection manager has to determine the rules for which some-
thing abnormal is observed, and assign a higher belief for such
rules. It uses two metrics; the rule frequency and its entropy.
The detection begins at the end of a time window when the
IPS uses the profile to determine if the current distributionis
different or consistent with history. The trigger of a possible
attack is the relative entropy defined in III-A. So if the
relative entropy is too low no rule will be selected because
the traffic have not changed. This is the “First Selection
Phase” on Figure 2. The process continues to the next step
if; K(f, f ′) > ω, wheref is the current distribution andf ′ is
the profile distribution.
This first checking is very useful in order to save resources.
This trigger is a global trigger and we need to know what
caused these changes and whether there is a potential attack.
To save resources, again, only rules with a significant fre-
quency change are checked out. RuleRi will be selected for
investigation if and only if at timet
fi(t)
fi(profile)
> 1 + γ, 0 ≤ γ
However, rules can have very high relative increases due to
an initial low frequency (e.g., at the beginning of a communi-
cation). Thus, only rules with a significant frequency will be
selected;fi(t) > ǫ.
C. Score manager
After the initial selection, the potential attacks have to be
extracted. To have an objective view, the knowledge of the
“nature” of the traffic is needed. The entropy and the frequency
metrics can help in this. Each metric can be “low” or “high”
depending on a thresholdα for the entropy andβ for the
frequency.
If the entropy is high that means that the traffic is well
distributed, thus there are two cases:
• high frequency (case 1): an attack is potential because
the traffic is well distributed and so all rules cannot be
high, and hence, having this rule being very different than
others is a good sign that it is a potential attack
• low frequency (case 2): so all the frequencies are about
the same and it seems that is not an actual threat but
maybe later because the frequency increased (first selec-
tion)
Considering the case of low entropy, there are also two cases
but the conclusions are not so evident because in this case the
frequencies are quite different:
• high frequency (case 3): in this case, the frequency
increases and now is high but it can be high because there
are a lot of different frequencies which can be lower. In
this case, the attack is potential but not as much as when
the entropy is high.
γ 0.4 b2 0.65
ω 0.05 b3 0.8
High entropyα 0.8 scorefactor 0.5
High frequencyβ 0.4 ǫ 0.01
b1 1 υ 0.05
TABLE I
THE VALUES OF THE DIFFERENT PARAMETERS
• low frequency (case 4): the frequencies are very different
and so probably there are high frequencies and thus the
current frequency is not a direct threat.
Only the first three cases seem to be used for the detection
with a different potential degree of attack, the aggressiveness
can be classified as follows: case 1> case 3> case 2.
Therefore, three numerical levelsb1, b2 and b3 differentiate
case 1, case 2 and case 3 and the rule score can be computed:
Si = fi ∗ bj (2)
wherebj is the corresponding case value.
Each IPS has to maintain a scores list of threats (i.e., a list
with tuples like< Rule, Score, Last update >). This list
has to be updated at the end of the detection window:
1) All scores are reduced by a factorscorefactor, say 0.5
(i.e., aging process). A score is removed if it is too low
(i.e., below a thresholdυ).
2) The score indicates a belief and the IPS has the current
scores list, the new scores list (previously calculated)
and a list of the scores from other IPS. By combining
the believes, the new current scores can be computed
thanks to the Dempster’s combination rule, please read
[3] for more details about it.
From Figure 2, the next step is the detection of abnormal
scores. Rules will be reclassified via another threshold;τ .
Rules with Score > τ are considered as very potential
attacks and will be managed by the detection manager (please
see the next section). Otherwise, the IPS sends the tuple
< Rule, Score > to the next downstream IPS which will
apply the belief combination function with this score.
D. Detection manager
There is a final step which aims to determine the packets rate
in packets per second because a suspect communication can
be only due to the increasing popularity of a service. First,for
each very potential attacks the IPS calculates the packets rate
from the frequency of the rule and the general used bandwidth
(BW). If the rate is highest than the capacity of the destination,
an attack is identified. Otherwise the IPS sends a message to
the next sibling which computes the used bandwith of the two
IPS, checks if the used bandwidth is too high (attack detected)
or continues to forward the request to the next sibling. If the
request goes back to the first IPS on the ring, there is no attack.
V. EVALUATION
In this section, we discuss the effectiveness of our system.
We built the system logic, and simulated it against healthy
traffic, and traffic with embedded attacks. The topology used
is generated with different depths (i.e., number of rings), and
different connectivities among the routers. Classically there
are 5 hosts to protect with 2 IPSs at the lowest level. The
fanning out effect is taken in consideration (that is outer rings
are larger in number than the inner rings as discussed before)
with a factor of 1.5 between the number of routers of two
consecutive layers.
A. Parameters
The main parameters of the simulation are defined with
similar values for all routers as in Table I. These parameters
were set by doing specific simulations where only one of them
vary in a simulation. Then, we keep the value which allows to
obtain the best results. All these simulations cannot be detailed
in this paper due to the space limitation. So, fixing the right
parameter needs a learning stage. Flow sizes are distributed
according to a power law formula to follow the behavior of
flow sizes and topology properties in the Internet [4] [5]. The
main property in power law formulae is their scale invariance.
As this property is preserved in exponential distribution,we
can use the latter as an approximation (i.e., to simplify
implementation). Having limited range in the free variable
ensures that the approximation is always acceptable. In other
words, flows to hosti have a relative size ofa × e−b∗i with
b chosen around 0.3 anda chosen to have the sum of relative
sizes equal to 1. All routers are assumed to have the same
capacity. The detection process is triggered every unit of tme.
For the simulations, a very high normal traffic is used (i.e., the
packet rates are close to an attack). The simulation is run over
100 units of simulation time (and detection periods) 2 kinds
of attack are simulated:
• Attack 1: low attack against host 1, with a frequency less
than 10% at each step, generated at the outer ring on
about the half of the routers
• Attack 2: aggressive attack against host 3, with frequency
greater than 30% at each step, generated at the outer ring
on about the half of the routers
For the profile, because no periodic traffic is generated,
an exponential moving average is used:fi(new profile) =
a.fi + fi(profile).(1− a). The parametera can be tuned and
for the tests the value is0.5.
B. Evaluation criteria
In the simulations, a router detects an attack if the score
is abnormal. The last step for calculating the packets rate is
not important for our simulation because the goal is to see if
the selection process works well. Three different metrics are
considered:
• The detection ratewhich is the number of attacks de-
tected divided by the total number of attacks
• A false alert is defined by a router detecting an attack
although if the rate is too low to be an attack. The number
of false alertsmetric is the total number of them for all
routers and for all simulation steps. The false alerts rate
is not useful as the detection process is always triggered
at each simulation step.
• Thedetection timeis the delay between the attack detec-
tion time and when the first attack packet is routed
C. Results
1) The score threshold parameter and the number of rings:
The score thresholdτ is still under investigation due to its
important role. Thus, the first experiment aims to show the
effect of this parameter and helps us to choose a value for
other experiments. An attack of type 1 is generated at time 50
with a varying topology from 1 to 8 rings. Figure 3(a) shows
the detection rate and Figure 3(b) shows the false alerts. An
attack is detected if at least one router detects it and all the
false alerts of the system are summed. For all experiments
except if mentioned, each point in the graphs is an average of
25 independent simulation runs like. Logically, the lower the
score threshold is, the higher the detection rate is.
Therefore filtering with an high threshold could discard real
attacks. In the same way many false alerts are discarded and
Figure 3(b) highlights the variation of the false alerts: most
of the curves look to be logarithmic-linear (zero values are
not displayed). For a topology of 5 rings,τ = 0.7 seems
to be a good choice to have a good detection rate with few
false alerts. The healthy traffic can be considered as false
alerts because our simulation limits the bandwith of its but
not its variation. Obviously, increasingτ limits to select the
healthy traffic rules and reduce the number of false alerts. The
detection time is relatively low and is less than one detection
window in the main cases and the highest observed value is
2.32.The very poor results for a one ring topology is a proof
that the collaboration between different rings improves greatly
the detection rate.
The second experiment is similar to the first one with only
3, 4, 5 or 8 rings and an attack of type 2 is triggered. This
attack is more aggressive and the detection rate should be
better. Indeed that is observed with a rate of 100% for all
configurations withτ ≤ 0.7. The false alerts were counted and
the graph is very close to the Figure 3(b). Thus, an attack does
not affect the false alerts number. This is intuitively plausible,
as false alerts are caused by cross-traffic that appears to the
detection metrics to be in the form of an attack.
2) The attack aggressiveness:Different attacks are gener-
ated from the type 1 attack (low attack) multiplied by a factor
(i.e., rate changes to cover different aggressiveness levels). In
order to see more visible variations, the score threshold is
fixed to have a detection rate above0.7 in the first simulation:
0.6 for 3 rings, 0.7 for 4 rings, 0.8 for 5 rings and 0.9 for
8 rings. Logically, the system detects more successfully the
more aggressive attacks and the detection rate increases very
slowly from an attack factor of 4 as can be seen in Figure 3(c)
(for those score thresholds). Thus, after a certain level of
aggressiveness, the system presents about the same satisfying
performances.
3) The ring efficiency:Four attacks are generated in the
n xt set of simulations. An attack of type 2 at time 40 and
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Fig. 3. Detection rate and false alerts
50 and an attack of type 1 at time 50 and 60 on a 5 rings
topology with τ = 0.7. The mean value of 250 simulation
runs is computed. The detection rate is detailed for each ring
and the best ring is 4 and after 3 in the Figure 4(a). The5th
ring has a relatively low detection rate because it receivesno
information from upstream routers. Thus, the exchanges of
scores between rings is a real factor to improve the detection
efficiency. This communication is done only if needed and this
is why the detection rate of rings 1 and 2 is very low because
the previous rings have already detected the attacks and did
not send the scores. As rings 1 and 2 do not often receive
scores, many false alerts are not triggered like in Figure 4(b).
The last one, Figure 4(c), highlights that the worst delay is
observed for the ring 3 due to the same reasons.
To be brief, the core of the prevention system is located
at rings 3, 4 and 5. This information is useful for a real
implementation to help determining the routers which have
to participate. Moreover it proves that the attack is detectd
early before reaching the final host, and very early into the
attack duration. As the ring which detects the attacks will
respond rapidly and be able to drop attack traffic early, all the
downstream network overload should be quickly decreased.
4) The efficiency of our multi-level approach:The dis-
tributed approach efficiency were highlighted in the first
simulations. Our framework is not only based on a scores
exchanges but also on a multi-level process. First of all, the
rules selection (selection manager) is very efficient because the
number of false alerts is reduced by 50% or more. However
the scoring process performed is also important because the
number of false alerts decreases also. The variation seems to
be lower (only 39% of false alerts) but an average of 49 false
alerts are avoiding thanks to this stage for 5 rings.
To be brief, the multi-level approach reduces the number of
false alerts. Moreover, less rules are selected and less score are
exchanged. Thus the overhead of the system is greatly reduced
thanks to this approach.
D. Communication and storage requirements
Regarding the previous results, an efficient system can
be composed of three rings from level 3 to level 5. The
simulation parameters implie respectively 4, 6 and 9 routers
at respectively level 3, 4 and 5. A router at leveli is
connected to a router at leveli − 1 with a probability
1/i. Therefore, the average value of needed connections is∑
5
i=4
1
i
×#routerslevel i×#routerslevel i−1 = 16, 8 where
#routers is the number of routers. Consequently, an attack
provokes an overhead of about 17 messages in the network.
VI. RELATED WORK
The collaboration between IPSs or firewalls is a topic
for which a lot of papers can be found. In [6] the author
proposes to use the distributed firewalls to counter efficiently
the attacks. The author collaborates with other to propose an
implementation in [7] but in fact only the rules to enforce
are exchanged. So each firewall has to detect the attacks
alone, the collaboration’s goal is to counter the attack at each
firewall to avoid traffic congestion. Our work goal is to use
the collaboration to detect the attacks.
In [8] a peer-to-peer approach is introduced and in [9]
a mobile-agent solution is proposed but in these 2 cases,
the hosts communicate to exchange the new detected threats.
Furthermore, they propose to detect another attack by using
what happen on different hosts. The difference with our
proposition is that the score is a compressed metric contrary
to the previous solutions which need to inspect users and I/O
actions.
In [10], an intelligent firewall is described in order to
detect attacks proactively. The idea is to use the different
characteristics of the emails to check a virus is attached. In
fact it’s filtering content which needs a lot of resources. So
at an ISP level, it needs too much resources and it is too
complicated contrary to our framework which uses only the
frequency and the entropy computed easily.
Other authors propose to use simple statistics but the metrics
used are not distributed over several IPS or firewalls. The
authors in [11] use the conditional legitimate probabilityto
d termine the deviation toward a profile.
The paper [12] aggregates the traffic in the network in order
to detect overloading links and to limit the rates for avoiding
it. The aggregation can be seen as a more general rule with
wildcards. The authors in [13] proposes to use belief function
to detect distributed denial of service attacks too but only
based on the number new source IP addresses. Our work
focuses more on the potential victimsi.e., the mechanism
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Fig. 4. Results of a 5 rings topology with a mix of attacks
observes the traffic to a certain destination according to a
specific rule. Thus it is a more practicable business solution
as an additional service offered by ISP to their clients who are
charged for this protection.
VII. C ONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS
In this paper, we propose a new framework to improve
the security at a higher network level that common solutions
which are applied at low levels in the networks because they
are not fitted for the ISPs level or because the ISPs have
no benefit to deploy them and prefer to leave the DDoS
problems to their clients. The key point is that IPSs can
communicate to each other in order to exchange valuable
information but not too much in order to avoid an attack
whose the goal would be to overload this system (denial of
service on the security infrastructure). Thus, we propose a
system where clients subscribe to the distributed protection
service with minimal communication overhead while avoiding
the service to be used by unsubscribing clients. IPSs in the
Tier 3 network will be arranged in virtual rings around each
client. Each IPS is responsible for selecting the rules for
which an attack is very potential. The collaboration takes place
through vertical communication to help to make this choice
and through horizontal communication to get a complete view
of the traffic going into the client. The alert information
technique guarantees the absence of false positives, usingthe
overall rate compared with the host capacity as a sure sign of
the existence of an attack. The simulation proves that a good
accuracy can be obtained and that our framework presents a
real benefit because the multi-level process to detect attacks
filter a lot of packets and extract only interesting rules. Thus
the number of false alerts is decreased and the IPS can inspect
in more details the suspect rules. Due to these facts we are
convinced that our framework is scalable and can provide a
real alternative to classical IPSs or other security equipments
by distributing the detection.
The plan for the future is to use real traces to test our
solutions and deal with other problems like; security for the
IPS communication, the effects of compromised IPSs or a
limited number of participating routers.
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